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The Brazilian economy is not decarbonizing and current policies are highly unlikely to 
change this. Expanding and diversifying the supply of renewable energy would improve 
price stability and enhance energy supply and access. Why do Brazilian governments 
adopt policy objectives and instruments which forego the significant benefits available 
from ambitious decarbonization objectives, and how can we explain differences across 
sectors? We analyze objectives and instruments in hydropower, transport fuels, solar- 
and wind energy. With the exception of hydropower, we find that the principle barrier 
to decarbonization are policy inconsistencies. In solar and, to a lesser extent, wind 
energy, national content requirements, a lack of R&D subsidies for building up 
domestic manufacturing capacities as well as the design of electricity auctions have 
stymied expansion. In transport fuels, the combination of inconsistent fiscal incentives 
and a price cap on gasoline have weakened the bioethanol sector in recent years. 
Emissions from the energy system are on a long-term upwards trajectory, present 





The Brazilian energy system is one of the cleanest in the world, yet the country is not 
on a decarbonization pathway. From the early 1990s until today, emissions from the 
energy system have roughly doubled, driven by population- and economic growth, 
growing demand for transport fuel and an increasing reliance on natural gas. Yet there 
is a distinctive lack of adequate public policies for the expansion and diversification of 
renewable energies. This is astounding, as numerous co-benefits would, in principle, 
be available from such policies: off-grid solar energy could contribute to electrification 
in those regions not connected to the transmission infrastructure; the availability of 
solar resources is synchronous with electricity demand due to the high prevalence of 
air conditioners; wind resources concentrate in structurally-weak regions where an 
expansion of wind energy could contribute to socioeconomic development; the 
availability of both wind and solar is countercyclical to the availability of water energy; 
expanding biofuels production would contribute to satisfying the increasing fuel 
demand; and, finally, different types of renewables are geographically complementary, 
with large wind resources being concentrated in the North-Eastern region, bioenergy 
from bagasse in the South-East and the largest untapped hydroelectric resources in the 
North. Moreover, unlike in most other countries, intermittency does not pose a problem 
as large hydropower reservoirs are able to supply sufficient baseload power to 
counterbalance peaks in demand (i.e. WRI 2015). 
The expansion and diversification of Brazil’s renewable energies would thus contribute 
in multiple ways to non-climate policy objectives, including economic development 
and energy security. Yet existing policy objectives are inadequate and make use of 
sometimes inconsistent instruments. This situation is reflected at the international level, 
where Brazil’s commitments under both the Copenhagen Accord and the Paris 
Agreement were largely limited to curbing emissions from deforestation. Beyond 
foregoing co-benefits at the domestic level, the timid energy policy also weakens 
Brazil’s diplomatic position internationally. Considering its self-understanding as a 
diplomatic leader among the countries of the Global South, particularly in the area of 
sustainable development, the gap between rhetoric and ambition is problematic. 
Given those circumstances, why is it that the existing policy objectives and instruments 
are not up to task? Moreover, how can we explain differences in objectives and 
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instruments across different types of renewable energies? In this paper, we focus on the 
solar-, wind-, hydro- and biofuels sectors. We argue that those sectors differ in terms 
of the gap between capacities and actual policies. Our case studies suggest that the 
primary explanatory factor is a lack of climate policy integration and, accordingly, the 
existence of numerous inconsistencies. In wind- and solar energy, national content 
requirements as a form of industrial policy create bottlenecks in the supply chains, thus 
hampering greater expansion. However, the greater availability of domestic production 
capacities for wind turbine equipment than for solar cells implies that the chilling effect 
of content requirements is smaller in the former than in the latter case. Fuel policy is 
similarly marred by inconsistent policies which have in recent years weakened Ethanol 
production. In large hydro power, finally, the gap between policies and capacities is the 
lowest of all the cases under consideration. This is due to the influence of entrenched 
interest groups adept at capturing public subsidies. We argue that, overall, the major 
structural factor inhibiting the diversification and expansion of renewable energies in 
Brazil are fossil fuel subsidies which have been rising constantly over the last two 
decades, while subsidies for renewable energies are predominantly geared towards 
large hydropower. 
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Brazilian emissions profile and the relevant 
domestic policies and instruments. Sections 3 to 6 deal with hydropower, ethanol, wind- 
and solar energy, respectively. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Emissions, objectives and instruments 
In this section, we first give an overview of the changing Brazilian emissions profile 
and the challenges it poses for energy- and climate policy. While emissions from the 
forestry sector have drastically declined in recent years, energy-related emissions have 
more than doubled since the early 1990s. At the same time, Brazilian governments have 
not committed to ambitious decarbonization targets. Where quantified targets exist, 
those are largely in line with business as usual. In terms of cross-cutting policy 
instruments for expanding and diversifying the supply of renewable energies, Brazil 
has mainly been relying on an auction system which possesses several flaws. Finally, 
subsidies are overwhelmingly geared towards fossil fuels, limiting the amount of 
resources available for renewables. 
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2.1 Energy and emissions 
The Brazilian energy system is historically one of the cleanest in the world. However, 
economic growth is not decoupling from greenhouse gas emissions. Both the Brazilian 
carbon intensity and energy intensity are, today, at roughly the same level as in the early 
1990s (EIA, source). Moreover, the share of renewables in primary energy production 
is in long-term decline (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Renewable- and non-renewable energies, 1970-2014, based on MMA, xx 
The present numbers still compare favorably to other industrialized- and emerging 
economies. Moreover, with 6% compound growth between 1990 and 2012, Brazilian 
greenhouse gas emissions have also been rising relatively slowly, presently amounting 
to about 1.4 GtCO2e per annum. Yet this trend obscures a fundamental shift in the 













































































Figure 2: Sources of Brazilian greenhouse gas emissions, based on SEEG (2013) 
As figure 2 shows, emissions from land-use change, particularly deforestation in the 
Amazonas region, are gradually giving way to other sources, particularly energy and 
agriculture. Since 1990, absolute emissions from both sectors have roughly doubled. 
While coal is largely irrelevant in the Brazilian context, the shares of gas and petroleum 
in primary energy production have been on an upwards trajectory since 1970. As the 
expansion of the domestic energy supply lags behind the growth in demand, natural gas 
imports have risen sharply since the mid-1990s, almost tripling to 7.1% of total energy 
consumption in 2014. The discovery of up to 50 billion barrels of pre-salt oil in Brazil’s 
continental shelf ensures that production will remain high for the foreseeable future, 
given a suitable macro-economic environment. Conversely, the production of 
hydropower and energy from sugar cane-derivatives (bioethanol and bagasse) has 
remained largely constant since the 1980s. Whereas wind energy and small hydro have 
been gradually expanding in recent years, solar energy is practically inexistent. 
With growing production and consumption of fossil fuels, it has been projected that, 
from 2020 onwards, “Brazil will be in a situation that is more similar to that of other 
industrialized countries, facing a new challenge of economic development with low-
GHG energy-related emissions” (La Rovere et al. 2013: 84). Despite the critical 
importance of those latter emissions, domestic mitigation actions are still largely 
limited to the forestry sector. As the overall relevance of emissions from land-use 



















forest conservation enjoys broad public support and has little impact on economic 
development, Brazil’s future role in international climate policy depends on the extent 
to which energy systems and agriculture will be de-carbonized. Yet, public policies to 
tackle those challenges are presently woefully inadequate. 
 
2.2 Domestic and international emissions targets 
Brazil has put in place several key pieces of targets and instruments over the last decade. 
Those are not always fully consistent with each other. The 2008 National Plan on 
Climate Change (PNMC) formed the basis of the Brazilian Copenhagen pledge yet was 
limited to curbing deforestation (PNMC 2008). The 2009 National Policy on Climate 
Change set a voluntary target of 36.1% to 38.9% emissions reductions from Business 
As Usual (BAU) until 2020. Decree 7,390 of 2010, implementing the PNMC, sets a 
BAU deviation target for the energy sector by 234 MtCO2e to 634 MtCO2e by 2020. 
Brazil’s 2010 communication of its Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions further 
specified those reductions: between 79 to 99 MtCO2e from the increased use of 
hydroelectricity; 26 to 33 from “alternative” energy sources (i.e. wind, solar and small 
hydro), 48 to 60 from increased use of biofuels and 12 to 15 from increases to energy 
efficiency (UNFCCC 2011: 8).1 Curiously, those numbers do not add up to the overall 
reduction target given under Decree 7,390. 
The Brazilian Nationally-Determined Contribution (NDC) to the 2015 Paris Agreement 
to the UNFCCC foresees emissions reductions of 37% by 2025 relative to 2005. While 
the adoption of an absolute target is remarkable, the sectoral policy objectives are 
largely in line with business-as-usual. The NDC seeks to increase the share of 
sustainable biofuels to 18%; achieve a 45% share of renewables, including by 
expanding non-hydropower renewables in the primary energy supply to between 28% 
and 33% and to 23% in electricity generation; and a 10% improvement to energy 
efficiency. The 45% renewables target by 2030 goes only slightly beyond the 43,5% 
renewables share in 2014, and the lower bound of the non-hydropower renewables 
                                                 
1 While intended to comply with the Copenhagen Accord, Brazil’s Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions have not been formally to it. 
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target as well as the 18% biofuels target have already been achieved as of 2014; (EPE 
2015: 18).  
Finally, the present, annually updated 10-year plan for energy expansion up to 2024 
aims at an overall renewables target in the energy supply of 45,2% and a non-hydro 
renewables target of 31,9%. The share of energy supply from sugar-cane derivatives, 
which includes electricity generation from bagasse, is to expand to 16.9% (MME 2015: 
436). Table 1 summarizes. 
 2014 2020 NAMA target 2015-2024 Plan 
for energy 
expansion 





43,5% share 153 to 192 MtCO2e  
BAU deviation  





27.9% share  26 to 33 MtCO2 
BAU deviation 
31,9% 28%-33% share  










Table 1: Brazilian renewables targets under Copenhagen, Paris and the 10-year plan for energy expansion 
 
2.3 Instruments 
Biofuels and large hydropower in Brazil date back to the 1970s. The first major 
initiative for the expansion of other renewables was the 2002 Programa de Incentivo 
às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica (PROINFA). After a country-wide drought 
in 2001 exposed the weaknesses of over-reliance on large hydropower, PROINFA was 
to expand the installed capacity in wind-, bioenergy and small hydropower by 1100 
MW respectively, by 2008. Originally making use of Feed-in Tariffs under the Cardoso 
administration, the program was re-structured to be based on auctions when Lula took 
office in 2003. PROINFA incorporated a national content requirement which was 
increased from 50% to 60% under the Lula administration. In the program’s second 
phase, which was never implemented, this requirement was supposed to increase to 
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90%. The reasoning was that the economic benefits of localizing the manufacture and 
assembly of relevant technologies would offset their costs in the long run.  
Notably, PROINFA did not contain a mandate for solar energy. The auctioning of 
power purchase agreements continued even after the program ended. Since 2007, 21 
technology-specific auctions geared towards renewable energies were held, some of 
which included successful tenders for solar energy. Wind energy, with 13600 MW, 
accounts for the largest contract volume awarded, followed by biomass (4500 MW) 
and small- as well as large hydropower (2770 MW in total).2 After the Brazilian 
government raised the price cap to attract foreign bidders, two auctions in 2015 resulted 
in contracts being awarded for the supply of 1.8 GW of solar energy. In the non-specific 
auctions, wind power has at times been able to successfully compete with natural gas-
fired thermal power plants; however, this has not been the case for solar energy (Luomi 
2014: 22).  
The post-PROINFA auctions do not have mandatory national content requirements. 
However, access to subsidized BNDES credits are contingent on localizing certain 
shares of production and / or assembly. Those requirements are increasingly being 
ratcheted up. This is a problem insofar that Brazil does not possess sufficient domestic 
capacities for producing high-tech components for wind turbines or solar cells. Another 
issue is that firms must legally commit to generating a certain amount of energy 
annually, with shortfalls being penalized. Particularly for wind energy, where 
forecasting is difficult, this introduces significant economic uncertainties. 
Numerous other instruments have been introduced in the last years. Some of those are 
sectoral in nature and will be discussed in more detail in the case studies. The Inova 
Energia programme of 2013 covers up to 90% of project costs for smart grids, hybrid 
vehicles and energy efficiency in transport. The program has a volume of R$ 3 billion 
(≈US$ 850 million) and is financed jointly by the BNDES, ANEEL and the Brazilian 
Innovation Agency (FINEP).  
 
Numerous tax exemptions apply to renewable energies, including for imported 
technologies (IRENA 2015). Under the Luz para Todos (Light for all) program of 2003, 
                                                 
2 Based on http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/pams/brazil/name-146121-en.php 
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the government finances up to 85% of project costs for expanding renewable energies 
in underdeveloped rural areas. The 10-year plan for energy expansion foresees 
investments into renewable energy installations in the order of R$ 229 billion (≈US$ 
64 billion) with R$ 155.8 billion intended for small hydro, wind, solar and biomass 
(MME 2015: 119).  
In parallel to public policies designed to expand and diversify renewable energies, 
subsidies for fossil fuels are substantial and growing. Those include, for instance, tax 
benefits such as for infrastructure development in the North, North-East and Central-
west regions; exemptions from import taxes for goods for oil- and gas-related research 
and extraction; and tax exemptions for coal- and gas power plants’ fuel costs. While 
overall volumes of subsidies are notoriously hard to estimate, a recent study estimates 
those annual fossil fuel subsidies for which data is available at close to US$ 5 billion 
(ODI 2015). The OECD presently lists 12 programs which create tax exemptions or are 
directly funding fossil energies, most of which are on an upwards trajectory.3 As a share 
of total subsidies, support for renewables numbers in the single digits and is 
overwhelmingly directed towards hydropower (Greenpeace 2013: 21-23). Table 2 
summarizes the major financial transfers and tax incentives for renewables and fossil 
fuels. 
 Programme Volume 
non-renewables Fuel Consumption Fund R$ 5 billion in 2015 
Energy Development Fund R$ 1 billion in 2014 
National Plan for Research and 
Development in the Oil and Gas 
Sector 
R$ 2,5 billion in 2014 
PIS/COFINS fuel tax reductions R$ 35.2 billion in 2014 
REPENEC R$ 198 million in 2014 
REPEX R$ 1.5 billion in 2014 
CIDE R$ 12.1 billion in 2014 
tax reductions for import and retail 
sale of naphta 
R$ 1.9 billion in 2014 
Tax exemptions for coal and gas 
used in electricity generation 
R$ 109 million in 2014 
REPETRO R$ 8.6 billion in 2014 
                                                 





Investments into renewable 
energy installations 
R$ 229 billion in 2015-2024 
Inova Energia R$ 3 billion in 2013 to 2016 
Luz para Todos 
 
R$ 7 billion from 2003 to 2008 
Table 2: Compilation of subsidies, sources: ODI (2015); OECD and IEA4 
 
2.4 The non-decarbonization puzzle 
The general picture which emerges is thus that, while energy-related emissions have 
increased dramatically over the last two decades and are bound to grow further, public 
policies are presently not up to task. Policy objectives for the Brazilian energy system 
suffer from inconsistencies and long-term targets which either have already been 
achieved or will be achieved under business-as-usual in the short run. National content 
requirements under PROINFA and the BNDES subsidized credit scheme have acted as 
a deterrent for the expansion and diversification of renewable energies other than hydro 
due to a lack of domestic manufacturing capacities. Considering the low level of 
subsidies for renewables, it is not surprising that such capacities have been developing 
only slowly.  
As will be further discussed below, substantial climate- and non-climate benefits 
would, in principle, be available through more ambitious policies. The extent to which 
those benefits are realized under actual policies varies strongly across the different 
sectors of the Brazilian energy system. In large hydropower, this gap is particularly 
narrow as little scope for expansion exists as of today. In transport fuels, the Brazilian 
bioethanol program is one of the most-successful ones in the world, yet has suffered in 
recent years due to a combination of policy choices and the decline of oil prices on the 
world market. In wind energy, some limited progress has been made in recent years 
while solar is, for practical purposes, inexistent. The following four sections attempt to 
explain the choice of objectives and instruments in those sectors.  
 
                                                 




The use of hydropower as a renewable energy source is deeply embedded in Brazil. For 
example, Brazil is a real giant in dam-building. By producing 36.9 Mtoe per year Brazil 
is only second to China which produces 61.4 Mtoe per year (WEC 2016). Depending 
on producing capacity, the Brazilian-Paraguayan Itaipu-Dam is the biggest dam 
worldwide along with China’s Three Gorges Dam. And yet, Brazil’s decades-long 
expertise with hydropower is not due to an enlightened environmental consciousness 
but to considerations of energy security and independency.  
Brazil heavily depends on hydropower. Usually, between 70 and 80 per cent of the 
country’s electricity generation derives from hydropower (IHA 2015: 38). Considering 
this high dependency, it is no surprise that the government under the recently 
impeached President Dilma Rousseff has been highly committed to hydropower with 
the objective of maintaining the current levels of hydropower production over the next 
ten years (MME/EPE 2015: 436). Maintaining current production levels also involves 
the building of new dams. And here, Brazilian hydropower becomes troubling. Brazil 
boasts more than 200 hydroelectric power plants ranging from small dams to mega-
dams (ANEEL 2016). Almost all mega-dams in Brazil are located in the Amazon River 
basin, after the Nile River the second largest river on this planet. The Amazon River 
basin houses the largest remaining rainforest on this planet and is home to one third of 
all species, one fourth of all freshwater, one fifth of all forests of this planet and the 
natural habitat of around 200 indigenous communities (IHA 2015: 38; The Nature 
Conservancy n.d.).  
It is in this region where the construction works of new dams occur, taking advantage 
of the huge river basins of the Amazon River’s tributaries. Two examples are the dams 
of Belo Monte and São Luiz dos Tapajós corresponding to 68 per cent of all new dams 
in planning or construction (EPE 2015: 84). These two dams - the Belo Monte dam 
nearing completion and the Tapajós dam still in planning stage - in particular are highly 
controversial and have been accompanied by intense social protests in and outside of 
Brazil. The Tapajós is one of the largest tributaries of the Amazon River and connects 
the Amazon basin with the Cerrado region further south, another Brazilian biome rich 
in biodiversity. Given its size, the life of countless animals and plants along with 
indigenous communities depends on the river (Great Rivers Partnership 2012). The 
 12 
construction of this dam does not only threaten the rich biodiversity of the whole river 
basin but also risks destroying the Munduruku indigenous community with around 
13,000 people (Douglas 2015). Notwithstanding the criticism from Brazilian and 
international civil society organizations and the Munduruku leaders regarding the 
severe social and environmental damage to be inflicted by the construction of the dam, 
the government plans to go ahead and auction the dam in the second half of 2016 
(Borges 2015). And Brazil’s ultraconservative Congress does everything to move the 
project forward in complete ignorance of the devastating social and environmental risks 
(Borges 2015). The example of Tapajós illustrates very well that the Brazilian 
government and Congress have not learned very much with the disaster of the Belo 
Monte dam.  
The Belo Monte dam on the Xingu River is supposed to be the third-largest dam 
worldwide after the Three Gorges dam and the Itaipu dam, diverting the flow of the 
Xungu River and thus destroying the livelihood of around 25,000 indigenous people 
and the rich biodiversity found in the river basin. It was in 2004 under former president 
Lula da Silva that the government circumvented environmental regulations and 
authorized the construction of eighteen new dams, among them the Belo Monte dam 
(International Rivers n.d.). The construction work has been moved along for more than 
one decade amidst a loaded atmosphere of social protest, indigenous mobilization, 
lawsuits filed against the project, workers’ strikes and court orders stopping the whole 
project (International Rivers n.d.). If this were not enough, the investigations in the 
context of the current “Car Wash” corruption scandal revealed that the 11 construction 
companies involved, most of them with no prior dam-building experience, paid 
altogether around R$150 million (appr. €37 million) to the government disguised as 
donations during the electoral campaigns of 2010, 2012 and 2014 (Cruz et al. 2016). 
To put it briefly, Belo Monte represents a prime example of the irresponsible, 
unsustainable and narrow-minded attitude of the government towards indigenous 
communities and the preservation of the Amazon rainforest and its rich biodiversity.  
These examples make very clear that the environmental consciousness of the current 
government and the majority of politicians in Brazil’s Congress is not highly 
developed. Dam-building is Brazil is still seen primarily as a fundamental element of 
the country’s energy security and independence, not necessarily as a worthwhile 
contribution to environmental protection.  
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What about Brazil’s showcase dam, the Itaipu dam on the Paraná River, built during 
the military dictatorship in the 1970s in a binational project involving Brazilians and 
Paraguayans. When tourists visit this wonder of engineering genius, which was erected 
in close proximity to the natural wonder of the Iguazú Falls, they are bombarded with 
the impressive facts and figures of Itaipu’s energy production and efficiency and its 
environmental and social responsibility. After all, Itaipu produces 15 per cent of the 
energy used in Brazil and a staggering 75 per cent of the energy consumed in Paraguay 
(Itaipu n.d.). These figures and facts of Itaipu’s clean energy production are based on a 
rather dirty history. The construction of Itaipu resulted in the devastation of wide 
stretches of the Atlantic Forest which includes the Sete Quedas Falls with seven large 
falls, a water fall hardly less impressive than the Iguazú Falls (Ziober et al. 2014: 60-
61). By flooding an area of 1460 km², these falls along with forests, plants and the 
homes of around 65,000 indigenous people was lost forever (Ziober et al. 61). For 
Itaipú, environmental concerns have always been secondary to the prime objective of 
energy generation (Ziober et al. 2014: 67-72). Even those degraded areas which were 
in fact reforested served security reasons such as the establishment of a security zone 
around the power plant (Ziober et al. 2014: 70). The company also prides itself for 
having rescued several animal species before flooding their natural habitats. And again, 
the company was not at all interested in preserving the natural biodiversity found in 
these areas. Some animals were merely rescued from drowning, when the area was 
already being flooded, while a large majority of other animals did drown. And those 
that were rescued were pit into inadequate shelters (Ziober et al. 2014: 71-72).  
To be sure, it would be quite naïve to expect any environmental consciousness of a 
military dictatorship in the 1970s. It is, however, highly worrying that more than forty 
years later, now in a democratic system, the logic of dam-building remains virtually 
unchanged in Brazil. This unchanged logic might come to haunt Brazil in the future, 
since the primary reason of energy security is not necessarily justified. First, all these 
major dams are fundamentally mismanaged in their construction stage creating huge 
overrun costs (Ansar et al. 2014). In the case of Belo Monte, the original costs of around 
R$16 billion have already skyrocketed to more than R$30 billion with no end in sight 
(Pereira 2013). The environmental damage committed by dams can have a severe 
impact on the energy production of these dams. The habitat loss and environmental 
degradation caused by the flooding of vast areas can result in droughts, savannaisation 
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and lower river levels which in turn exacerbate global climate change and negatively 
affect the dam’s energy production (Lees 2016).  
 
4. Ethanol  
The production of biofuels in form of sugar-cane based ethanol has a long tradition in 
Brazil, dating back to 1975 when Brazil’s National Ethanol Program (ProÁlcool) was 
called into life. As in the case of hydropower, the then military dictatorship stimulated 
ethanol production for reasons of energy security. Initiated after the oil crisis of 1973, 
the military dictatorship sought to strengthen Brazil’s traditionally string sugar market 
(Ferreira Simoes 2007: 19). After all, sugarcane profoundly shaped Brazil’s society and 
economy for centuries, associated with the outraging atrocities of slavery and the 
shocking wealth of tiny elite of landowners (Schwartz 1984).  
Brazil’s production of sugarcane-based ethanol has experienced several ups and downs 
in the last few decades (Rosillo-Calle and Cortez 1998; Ferreira Simoes 2007). 
Notwithstanding several crises of the Ethanol Program, which was closely related to 
the recovery of the oil price, the focus on ethanol contributed to the emergence of a 
strong ethanol producing industry, a highly innovative research sector and several 
regulations legally entrenching the use of ethanol as fuel in Brazil (Rothkopf 2007; 
Belik and Feige 1998). In 1993, the federal government introduced a law making the 
mixture of ethanol and gasoline an obligation by setting the percentage of ethanol at 22 
per cent (Lei N◦ 8.723, Art.9). Ethanol production returned on the political agenda of 
the federal government in 2003 with the newly elected president Lula da Silva making 
ethanol production a high priority. His government introduced the flex fuel motor 
making it possible for all cars in Brazil to either use gasoline, hydrated ethanol (curs 
exclusively run by ethanol) or a blend of gasoline and ethanol (Biodiesel 2013). In 
2007, the government increased the obligatory percentage rate of ethanol in the 
gasoline-ethanol blend from the former 22 per cent to 25 per cent (Portaria N◦ 143). All 
these investments into ethanol production, accompanied by the political will of the 
federal government to entrench the use of ethanol-fueled cars in Brazil and the further 
development of the private sector has made Brazil a leading producer and exporter of 
sugarcane-based ethanol with the strongest industry and research sector on ethanol 
found in Brazil (Rothkopf 2007: 447; IEA 2006: 11).  
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The governments of Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011 – 2016) have 
also turned ethanol production into a major foreign policy issue praising the benefits of 
ethanol production in the fight against climate change and emphasizing its development 
potential for developing countries in the global south (Fraundorfer 2015: 144-147). By 
creating a powerful discourse embracing the environmental and social benefits of 
ethanol production and relying on its strong domestic market, Brazil has been 
successful in playing a significant role in several global governance mechanisms on 
biofuels. The most important mechanism is certainly the Global Bioenergy Partnership 
founded in 2006 to promote dialogue and cooperation on biofuels at the global level. 
Together with Italy, Brazil has been the co-chair of this partnership since 2008 
(Fraundorfer 2015: 153; GBEP 2016). The GBEP represents the top forum on biofuels 
at the global level by uniting all important biofuel producing countries, international 
organisations and companies. Through its activities in working groups and task forces, 
Brazil has been able to use the GBEP as a platform to disseminate the expertise and 
knowledge of its own decades-long ethanol production and entrench it as a viable 
alternative to fossil fuels (Fraundorfer 2015: 153-156, 159). In the same vein, the 
Brazilian government has reinforced its cooperation with the US, Brazil’s major rival 
in the production of ethanol, the EU and other biofuels producing countries 
(Fraundorfer 2015: 156-159).  
As in the case of hydropower, the production of ethanol has repeatedly created 
controversies about its actual environmental and social benefits. Civil society 
organizations and scientists warn that the production of biofuels from food crops can 
have a tremendous environmental impact such as soil damage due the conversion of 
land from the cultivation of monocultures (Oxfam 2008; Fargione et al. 2008). Fargione 
et al. have found that Brazil’s sugarcane-based ethanol is much more environmentally 
friendly than the US-based production of ethanol from corn or the production of 
ethanol. For instance, while sugarcane-based ethanol produced in Brazil’s Cerrado 
region would take 17 years to offset the carbon debts generated during the production 
process, corn-based ethanol in the US takes between 48 and 93 years (Fargione et al. 
2008: 1236). In Brazil, civil society actors argue that the production of ethanol 
indirectly threatens the Amazon rainforest by pushing cattle farming closer to the 
Amazon. In addition, many sugarcane plantations in the south and centre of Brazil are 
dangerously close to the Pantanal and located in the Cerrado, two other rich biomes 
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(UNICA 2008). So, the production of ethanol-based sugarcane is certainly not risk-free, 
particularly not if the main responsibility is with large corporations whose commercial 
interests trump environmental and social concerns. Therefore, it is not the least 
surprising that the Brazilian ethanol sector is riddled with scandals about slave labor, 
inhuman working conditions in production plants and other grave human rights 
violations (Mendonça 2009; Repórter Brasil 2010; Saragoussi 12 March 2013; Gomes 
09 May 2013). The Sao Paulo Sugarcane Industry Association UNICA, a powerful 
association of ethanol producers in the State of Sao Paulo has tried to improve the image 
of the sector by introducing stricter environmental and social regulations (Fraundorfer 
2015: 141-142). These activities may have somewhat improved the working conditions 
in the production plants. The social situation of many workers in ethanol production 
plants and plantations, however, remains worrying (Gomes 09 May 2013; Repórter 
Brasil 2011).  
Due to the introduction of flex fuel vehicles, anhydrous ethanol (blended with gasoline) 
can be substituted by hydrous (pure) ethanol. The relative competitiveness of the two 
fuel types hinges on the price difference between ethanol and gasoline. Due to its lower 
energy density, the break-even price is reached when the former costs roughly 70% of 
the latter (Ackrill and Kay 2014: 40). Since 2010, the changes in the price ratio have 
had detrimental effects on ethanol consumption (IEA 2014: 45-46). The decrease in 
global oil prices and the recent increase in ethanol production costs, due to a 
combination of bad harvests and high sugar prices on the world market, implies that 
consumers tend to choose anhydrous over hydrous ethanol. Due to declining 
production, Brazil started importing ethanol from the US in 2011. Those problems are 
exacerbated by the recent introduction of a price cap on gasoline which observers have 
linked to attempts to control inflation as well as to appease the electorate prior to the 
2014 presidential elections. Jointly, this creates disincentives to consume greater 
amounts of ethanol (Khanna et al. 2016). 
Direct budgetary transfers have largely been slashed with the end of ProÁlcool in 1991 
and the liberalization of the Brazilian fuel market throughout the 1990s (Ackrill and 
Kay 2014: 34-37). The CIDE tax which had included different rates for ethanol and 
gasoline and accounted for 95% of total subsidies for the latter in 2002-3, was abolished 
in 2012 and re-introduced, at a lower rate, in 2015. Combined with the price cap on 
gasoline, ethanol subsidies became negative in 2012 (Jales and da Costa 2014). 
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Presently, the primary policy instrument is thus the blending mandate for anhydrous 
ethanol. 
 
5. Wind energy 
Brazilian wind energy has expanded rapidly in the last years, from a generation of 29 
MW in 2005 to 8715 MW in 2015. Wind resources are distributed unevenly, with the 
highest incidence in the Northeast and the South. Off-shore installations are presently 
not being considered due to prohibitive costs (MEA 2014: 8). Expanding the share of 
wind energy in the energy mix requires long-distance transmission, a problem which is 
exacerbated by the inadequate Brazilian grid. As the largest share of electricity is 
consumed in the South-East region, grid improvements are vital if Brazil is to increase 
its share of wind energy. The potential for wind energy is enormous and is estimated at 
300 GW. According to one estimate, the expansion of wind energy to 10% of electricity 
generation by 2030 would entail welfare losses of merely 0.1% (Landis and Timilsina 
2015). Moreover, Brazil has one of the world’s lowest generation costs, surpassed only 
by China and India. As the largest wind resources concentrate in structurally-weak parts 
of the country, stronger investments would also contribute to greater socio-economic 
development. 
The first government scheme to hike up wind energy was the PROEOLICA program 
of 2001, introduced after a country-wide drought had highlighted the risks of over-
reliance on hydropower. Intended as an emergency measure to provide for 1050 MW 
of wind energy by 2003, PROEOLICA was a failure. Wind energy was subsequently 
integrated into the PROINFA initiative where it, at times, successfully competed 
against fossil fuels in non-technology specific auctions. With 1422 MW of capacity 
being added, the PROINFA targets for wind energy were actually overachieved. 
Wind energy was subject to the mandatory national content requirement under 
PROINFA. As in solar, this created substantial bottlenecks as, when PROINFA was 
introduced, the only local company able to produce the requisite technology was the 
Danish manufacturer Vestas. Today, producers must equally satisfy the content 
requirement to obtain favorable BNDES credit. Those requirements have recently been 
ratcheted up. As of January 2014, the BNDES requires that certain turbine components 
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(such as gearboxes, towers or blades) be manufactured or assembled in Brazil. From 
2017, over 70% need to be produced locally (MEA 2014: 10-16). However, domestic 
capacities have been increasing in recent years as large numbers of European and North 
American manufacturers have entered the market (MEA 2014: 11-14). 
 
6. Solar energy 
Unlike for wind energy and hydropower, the distribution of solar irradiance is relatively 
homogenous throughout Brazil (Martins et al. 2007). While the availability of solar 
resources in Brazil is higher than in Europe, solar energy is “virtually inexistent” 
(Martins et al. 2007: 524). In fact, its share in the Brazilian energy matrix is so 
negligible that it is usually not even reported in official statistics and documents, 
including the 2007 National Plan on Climate Change. In 2011, installed capacity 
amounted to a meagre 5 MW out of a total capacity of 126.743 MW (MME 2014: 45). 
Yet, large potential exists for building-integrated photovoltaics in urban areas where 
the electricity demand curve peaks during day time due to the widespread use of air 
conditioning (Jardim et al. 2008). Off-grid solar energy would reduce losses from 
inefficient transmission and distribution. It would also offer significant advantages for 
the Amazonas region, large parts of which are not connected to the Brazilian grid, with 
diesel generators instead supplying most electricity (Martins et al. 2008). The seasonal 
availability of solar energy is also anticyclical to that of hydropower; expanding solar 
energy would thus counterbalance shortages during the summer and enhance the 
security of energy supply during particularly hot seasons.  
The main barrier to expanding solar energy appears to lie in policy inconsistencies, in 
particular with the national content requirement as a form of industrial policy. 
Subsidized credit from the BNDES is only available for manufacturers which utilize 
domestically-manufactured solar modules. This constrains the capacity for solar 
development, as no such domestic manufacturing capacities currently exist. While 
Brazil is one of the world’s largest suppliers of metallurgical-grade silicon, it does not 
possess the requisite capacities for sufficient purification. As the silicon component, by 
itself, accounts for roughly 20% of final costs, the content requirement strongly limits 
the potential for expanding solar energy. Those content requirements will be ratcheted 
up over the coming years. Presently only covering solar panels, from 2018 onward, 
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junction boxes, power inverters and supporting structures will equally need to be 
manufactured domestically. 
However, the recent spike in power purchase agreements awarded to producers of solar 
energy suggests that several regulatory changes might create a more conducive 
environment for the expansion of solar energy. Since 2014, contracts have been granted 
for the development of 1750 MW of solar energy. Compared to a total electricity 
consumption of 516.2 TWh as of 2013, this is but a drop of the ocean. The situation 
might be changing, though, as several important changes have recently been 
implemented. For one, the government has raised the price caps in recent auctions, 
increasing the attractiveness of bidding. The recent introduction of solar-only auctions, 
two of which took place in October 2014 and August 2015, improves the capacity for 
expansion as solar need not compete with established (and cheaper) sources of energy, 
such as biomass or large-scale hydropower. The electricity regulation agency ANEEL 
has also reduced the red tape for net-metering. Presently, owners of small-scale (up to 
5 MW) solar installations can offset their electricity bills by feeding excess electricity 
back into the grid, while still being barred from selling directly to third parties.5 The 
ministry of mines and energy (MME) has introduced a tax incentives program in 
December 2015, which offers tax exemptions on electricity fed back to the grid and 
reduced import taxes for PV equipment from 14% to 2%. Since 2015, numerous 
Brazilian states created tax breaks for solar energy as well. Finally, solar energy has 
recently been included in the semi-conductor programme PADIS (Programa de apoio 
ao desenvolvimento tecnológico da indústria de semicondutores) which also offers 
numerous tax breaks.6 On top of those regulatory changes, the Brazilian manufacturer 
Globo Brasil opened in August 2015 the country’s first solar panel factory with a 
capacity of producing up to 2.000 solar panels per day.7 With other factories in 
construction, this will enhance access to subsidized BNDES credits, as utilities will 
have an easier time in complying with the national content requirements. 
 
 
                                                 
5 ANEEL resolution No. 687, November 2015 
6 PADIS is currently on hold, barring an extension  
7 See http://www.paineisglobobrasil.com.br/  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
Our preliminary analysis highlights three factors which explain the insufficient 
expansion and diversification of renewables in Brazil. First, changes in the regulatory 
environment are highly erratic. Particularly the case of bioethanol and fuel taxation 
shows how Brazilian governments have resorted to ad hoc measures which complicate 
long-term investment decisions. Second, there is insufficient climate policy integration. 
Since the end of PROINFA, Brazil has lacked a centralized policy framework for 
renewables. Inconsistencies such as national content requirements without domestic 
manufacturing capacities have stymied the development of solar and, to a lesser extent, 
wind energy. Similarly, the price cap on gasoline may have contributed to inflation 
control and success at the ballot box yet has weakened the Brazilian ethanol sector. 
Third, tax incentives and direct budgetary transfers are overwhelmingly biased towards 
fossil fuels. This has had negative impacts on the ethanol sector where direct subsidies 
have largely been removed throughout the 1990s. In wind and solar, the volume of 
subsidies, such as under the Inova Energia programme, remain meagre and do not 
contribute to the expansion of those energy sources 
It is clear why the Workers’ Party (PT) governments have promoted hydropower and 
the production of sugarcane-based ethanol as its answer to the fight against climate 
change. Both hydropower and ethanol production are deeply embedded in Brazil with 
a powerful industry and decades-long expertise. Furthermore, as the unfolding “Car 
Wash” corruption scandal has illustrated the political elites in Brazil are deeply 
enmeshed with the economic elites. The PT has understood to transform this close 
relationship into an unprecedented art form by designing elaborate corruption schemes 
to be used for money laundering. The construction of the Belo Monte dam served this 
particular purpose where the federal government accepted irresponsible environmental 
damage and grave human rights violations against workers and local indigenous 
communities for the sake of mere energy security and electricity generation, not for the 
sake of the environment (Brum 2016). Lula da Silva during his time as president also 
downplayed the series of grave human rights violations in Brazil’s ethanol sector and 
minimized the environmental risks involved in ethanol production for the sake of 
increased influence and power on the global stage, not for the sake of serious 
environmental concerns. 
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Internationally, insufficient policy objectives and inadequate (or even inconsistent) 
instruments weaken Brazil’s diplomatic position in the post-Paris climate negotiations. 
The negligence of energy-related emissions in Brazil’s NDC and the focus on the low-
hanging fruit of emissions from land-use change and forestry highlights a distinct lack 
of ambition in contributing to global mitigation efforts (Fraundorfer and Rabitz 2015). 
This stands in stark contrast to Brazil’s self-avowed leadership role among the countries 
of the global south in the international politics of sustainable development. Moreover, 
inconsistent and erractic policy-making, in conjunction with subsidies being biased 
towards fossil fuels and large hydro, foregoes significant co-benefits which would be 
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